How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting by Hovakimian, Armen et al.
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect
Bank Risk-Shifting






RightCenter for Economic Institutions 




  CEI Working Paper Series, No. 2002-10 
 
How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics 
Affect Bank Risk-Shifting  
 
Armen Hovakimian 
















Center for Economic 
Institutions 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
Institute of Economic Research 
Hitotsubashi University 
2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603    JAPAN 
Tel:  +81-42-580-8405 
Fax:  +81-42-580-8333 

















Abstract: Risk-shifting occurs when creditors or guarantors are exposed to loss without 
receiving adequate compensation. This project seeks to measure and compare how well 
authorities in 56 countries controlled bank risk shifting during the 1990s. Although 
significant risk shifting occurs on average, substantial variation exists in the effectiveness 
of risk control across countries. We find that the tendency for explicit deposit insurance 
to exacerbate risk shifting is tempered by incorporating loss-control features such as risk-
sensitive premiums, coverage limits, and coinsurance. Introducing explicit deposit 
insurance has had adverse effects in environments that are low in political and economic 
freedom and high in corruption.  
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Credible deposit insurance offers benefits to short-horizoned policymakers and 
politicians. It can eliminate the threat of depositor runs and protect small depositors 
without its full economic cost immediately registering on the government budget. Part of 
the cost of deposit insurance is that it reduces incentives for depositors to monitor and 
police their banks.  In countries that have not introduced deposit insurance explicitly, 
insurance is implicit.  The costs and benefits society experiences from either type of 
guarantees depend on how effectively government regulators can control bank risk-
shifting (Buser, Chen, and Kane, 1981; Brickley and James, 1988; Calomiris, 1992; Kane, 
1995; Honohan and Klingebiel, 2001).  
Risk-shifting occurs whenever a contractual counterparty is exposed to loss from 
fraud, leverage or earnings volatility without being adequately compensated for the risk 
entailed.  Other things equal, a bank can shift risk onto its deposit insurer in two principal 
ways: by increasing its leverage and by increasing the volatility of its return on assets. 
Risk-shifting is subsidized whenever the value of the explicit and implicit deposit 
guarantees a country’s banks enjoy exceeds the implicit and explicit premiums the 
insurer imposes on them.  To avoid subsidizing bank risk taking, a deposit insurer must 
monitor and police both activities appropriately.  
The empirical literature on bank risk-shifting begins with Marcus and Shaked 
(1984).  They use a one-year put option model to estimate a risk-adjusted “fair” value for 
a bank’s deposit insurance premium. The authors find that on average FDIC insurance 
  1was overpriced, but that the distribution of fair premiums was strongly skewed to the 
right.  Using improved one-period model of Ronn and Verma (1986), Duan, Moreau and 
Sealey (1992) test for the presence of risk shifting. The authors find that only twenty 
percent of their sample of thirty large U.S. banks exhibits risk-shifting behavior between 
1976 and 1986.  
Using both single-period and infinite-maturity option models of bank deposit 
insurance, Hovakimian and Kane (2000) test the risk-shifting hypothesis on a sample of 
123 U.S. banks covering the 1985-1994 time period. They find that on average capital 
regulation did not prevent the sample banks from shifting risk. The evidence of risk-
shifting is particularly strong for poorly capitalized banks and banks with high ratios of 
insured deposits to insured debt. 
This paper analyzes cross-country differences in bank risk-shifting behavior. 
Kane (2000) argues that the design of a country’s financial safety net should take 
country-specific factors into account: differences in informational environments and in 
the enforceability of private contracts in particular. Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002) 
contend that explicit deposit insurance should not be adopted in countries with a weak 
institutional environment. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) find cross-country 
evidence that, in countries with weak institutional environments, explicit deposit 
insurance increases the probability of banking crises.  
Laeven (2002a) interprets estimates of the fair deposit insurance premium as a 
proxy for bank risk and shows that this proxy helps to forecast bank distress in different 
countries.  Laeven (2002b) investigates how country-specific and bank-specific features 
contribute to the value of insurance services. He finds that the opportunity-cost value of 
  2deposit insurance services is higher in countries with explicit deposit insurance. The 
detrimental impact of explicit deposit insurance is largely offset in countries with high-
quality and well-enforced legal systems. 
Using a two-equation regression model introduced by Duan, Moreau, and Sealey 
(1992) and adapted by Hovakimian and Kane (2000), this paper investigates how well 
authorities in 56 countries controlled risk-shifting incentives in recent years. We find 
evidence of significant risk shifting, on average. Our methods also show substantial 
variation in the effectiveness of risk control across countries. As hypothesized in Kane 
(2000), significant portions of this variation are explained by differences in deposit-
insurance design features and in environmental measures of political repression, 
economic freedom, and government corruption. Specifically, we find that introduction of 
explicit deposit insurance exacerbates risk shifting, but that this effect is tempered when 
loss-control features such as risk-sensitive deposit insurance premiums, coverage limits, 
and coinsurance are incorporated into the deposit-insurance system. We also find that 
introducing explicit deposit insurance expands risk-shifting opportunities in 
environments that are low in political and economic freedom and high in corruption. 
Regression results confirm that recent adopters of explicit insurance have done a 
particularly poor job of managing the value of their deposit guarantees. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the methods used to model 
bank risk-shifting behavior. Section II describes the sources of our data and our sampling 
procedures. Section III presents and interprets estimates of risk-shifting incentives.  In 
this section and in Section IV, the analysis focuses on how risk-shifting differs across 
  3countries that manage their deposit insurance system in different ways and under 
different circumstances. Section V summarizes our findings. 
I.  Role of Alternative Deposit-Insurance Models 
  This section describes procedures for estimating risk-shifting opportunities at 
individual banks. Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1992) show that we can summarize bank-
risk shifting incentives in two equations: 
 B/V  =  α0 + α1σV + ε, (1) 
 IPP  =  β0 + β1σV + ε. (2) 
In these equations, B is the face value of deposits and other debt, V is the market value of 
a bank’s assets, σV is the standard deviation of asset returns, and IPP is the “fair” deposit 
insurance premium per dollar of deposits. The intuition is that a bank sets its asset risk, 
σV, as an exogenous variable and that creditors and regulators react to this choice.  The 


















+ ≡ . (4) 
Merton (1977) models each bank’s deposit insurance guarantee as a simple put 
option that the insurer holds on the bank’s assets.  This simple option formulation implies 
that, other things equal, the value of deposit insurance increases in σV and B/V.  The 
positive partial derivatives  V IPP ∂σ ∂  and  ) / ( V B IPP ∂ ∂   that this model generates 
imply that bank stockholders can easily extract value from the insurer.  However, in 
  4practice, the deposit-insurance contract conveys loss-control powers to the put holder that 
permit a conscientious insurer to monitor and control its risk exposure in client banks. 
Risk-sensitive capital requirements modify the net benefits of risk-taking by 
introducing penalties that enter the relationship between B/V and σV with a negative sign. 
Hence, equation (1) provides a way to estimate whether or not regulatory and market 
discipline forces a bank to increase its capital enough to compensate creditors and 
guarantors for increases in asset volatility. A negative α1 would imply that risk-sensitive 
capital regulation and complementary market discipline succeed in negating a bank’s 
option-induced benefits from increased leverage.  
Given the external discipline a bank faces, the fair premium, IPP, measures 
whether and how asset volatility influences the value of the implicit and explicit 
government guarantees that are imbedded in the bank’s stock price. To fully neutralize 
risk-shifting incentives, disciplinary penalties and the induced decline in B/V must be 
large enough to fully offset whatever increase in IPP would otherwise be generated by a 
higher σV. Empirically, a non-positive β1 would indicate that the risk-shifting incentives 
were fully neutralized.    
  Thus, for market and regulatory pressure to consistently discipline and potentially 
neutralize risk-shifting incentives, two conditions must be met: 
Capital increases with volatility:      α1 < 0, 
Guarantee value does not rise with volatility:  β1 ≤ 0. 
None of the variables featured in equations (1) and (2) is directly observable.   
However, Marcus and Shaked (1984) show how to use option-based models of deposit 
insurance to track these variables synthetically.  Because unobservable expectations play 
  5a central role in term-structure and asset-pricing theories, running regressions on 
synthetic data sets is a common practice in finance.  Such experiments test substantive 
hypotheses about asset valuation jointly with the hypothesis that the synthetic 
observations are unbiased estimates of the true or “natural” variables.  We cannot rule out 
the possibility that measurement error and simultaneous-equation bias account for some 
of our results.  These concerns make robustness testing doubly important. 
The first step in the Marcus-Shaked procedure obtains tracking values for V and 
σV by numerical methods.  These values are then used to estimate IPP as the value of a 
put option on bank assets. The procedure begins by solving the call-option formula for 
equity, E. The last step uses Îto’s lemma to link σV to E, V and σE (the instantaneous 
standard deviation of equity returns) by means of equation (5): 
  σV = σE(E/V)/(∂E/∂V). (5) 
To establish whether inferences are robust to differences in how forbearance is modeled, 
we conducted regressions using estimates of V, σV, and IPP derived from three different 
models of deposit-insurance option value.
1 
The first model follows Merton (1977) in portraying deposit insurance as a single-
period European put option on the bank’s assets. This model treats bank equity as the 
sum of a dividend-unprotected European call option and the present value of the 
dividends distributed before the next audit. The bank’s debt is assumed to mature in one 
year, which is also the assumed exercise date for the insurer. The model expresses the 
value of a bank’s equity, E, and the value of the fair deposit insurance premium, IPP, as: 
  E = V[1-(1- δ)
T] + V(1- δ)
TN(x1) - BN(x2), (6)   
                                                           
1 Hovakimian and Kane (2000) provide a detailed discussion of these models. 
  6   IPP = N(-x2) - (1- δ)
TN(-x1)V/B. (7) 
In (6) and (7), δ is the fraction of bank assets distributed at each interim dividend date to 
stockholders, T is the number of interim dividend payments, N(xi) states the probability 
that the variate value x is ≤ x i, given that x is distributed with zero mean and unit 
variance.
2  
Ronn and Verma (1986) adapt Merton's model to account for market conjectures 
that the FDIC may forbear from exercising its implicit call on the put when its claim is 
only slightly in the money.  The RV model scales down the effective exercise price of the 
put by a factor of ρ = 0.97.  Our second model employs an adaptation of the RV model 
devised by Hovakimian and Kane (2000):  
  E = V[1-(1- δ)
T] + V(1- δ)
TN(x3) - ρBN(x4), (8)   
  IPP = N(-x4) - (1- δ)
TN(-x3)V/B. (9) 
The third model also appears in Hovakimian and Kane (2000). It assigns 
stockholder benefits from forbearance only to banks that actually experience a capital 
shortfall. This model suppresses the forbearance benefit (1-ρ)BN(x2) for solvent banks.  
The value of a bank’s equity becomes: 
  E = V[1-(1- δ)
T] + V(1- δ)
TN(x3) - ρBN(x4) - (1-ρ)BN(x2), (10)   
  IPP = N(-x4) - (1- δ)
TN(-x3)V/B - (1-ρ)N(x2) .  (11) 
  These models fix ρ at either 1.0 or 0.97 for every country at every date.  Although 
one might usefully experiment with other specifications, the policy implications of our 
regression tests prove relatively insensitive to this parameter. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
  7  Pennacchi (1987a and b) shows that, by counterfactually presuming prompt and 
complete insolvency resolution, single-period models of IPP tend to understate the 
benefits that government guarantees convey to bank stockholders.  In exploring risk-
shifting opportunities and authorities’ ability to control them, this bias promises to 
increase the power of regression tests based on Merton’s minimal-forbearance model. 
II.  Sample Selection and Data 
  The paper uses annual data from 1991 through 1999. Bank-level data come from 
two sources. Monthly stock prices and annual market values of equity are obtained from 
Datastream. Balance-sheet data come from Bankscope.
3  Data on incentive-modifying 
deposit insurance features employed in different countries come from the World Bank 
Survey of Prudential Regulations and Supervision of Commercial Banks and from the 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci (2001) database studied by Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002). 
  Country characteristics are measured on three dimensions.  Repression of political 
rights and civil liberties is measured by the Freedom House,
  which constructs a 
categorical repression indicator.
4  This indicator recognizes three categories: free, partly 
free, and not free. The second index is a measure of economic freedom compiled by the 
Heritage Foundation.
5   The third index reports the perceived corruption of national 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 x1 = [ln((1-δ)
TV/B)+σV
2 T/2]/(σV√T), x2 = x1 - σV√T, x3 = [ln((1-δ)
TV/ρB)+σV
2 T/2]/(σV√T), x4 = x3 - 
σV√T. 
3 To scale down the number of listed banks in Japan and the US, we include only long-term credit, city and 
trust banks in Japan and in the U.S. only multinational and superregional banks as these are defined by 
Goldman Sachs in its Global Banks Fact Sheet (July 2000). 
4 These data are explained at the following website: http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
5 The economic freedom index tracks the following factors: Corruption in the judiciary, customs service, 
and government bureaucracy; Non-tariff barriers to trade, such as import bans and quotas as well as strict 
labeling and licensing requirements; The fiscal burden of government, which encompasses income tax 
rates, corporate tax rates, and government expenditures as a percent of output; The rule of law, efficiency 
within the judiciary, and the ability to enforce contracts; Regulatory burdens on business, including health, 
safety, and environmental regulation; Restrictions on banks regarding financial services, such as selling 
  8governments (CP) as assessed by Transparency International.
6    This index ranks 
countries on a scale of 1 (very corrupt) to 10 (not corrupt). The CP is based on surveys of 
business people, academics, and risk analysts.
  Because the three indices measure related 
aspects of a country’s institutional infrastructure, pairwise correlations among the indices 
range between 0.54 and 0.67. The descriptive statistics for these indices as well as for 
various features of the deposit insurance schemes employed by the countries in our 
sample are provided in Panel A of Table I. 
  Individual-bank data were screened in two ways.  First, to be included into our 
sample, the datasets must record at least three years of data on the input variables needed 
to calculate B/V, σV, and IPP. Second, to guard against data-entry errors, observations 
generating extreme values for these variables (i.e., below the first or above the ninety-
ninth percentiles) are trimmed away.  These screening criteria are satisfied for a total of 
2,255 bank-year observations. The political freedom indicator is available for 2,192 
observations. The economic freedom index is available for 1,533 observations. The CP is 
available for 1,401 observations. 
  Panel B in Table I summarizes sample coverage by country, year, and deposit 
insurance status. Our sample covers 390 banks representing 56 countries. The number of 
observations per country varies from four (one bank) for Russia to 309 (42 banks) for 
Denmark.  Ten countries (299 observations) limit themselves to implicit deposit 
insurance during our observation period. Eight more countries (351 observations) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
securities and insurance; Labor market regulations, such as established work weeks and mandatory 
separation pay; and Black market activities, including smuggling, piracy of intellectual property rights, and 
the underground provision of labor and other services. 
6 Additional details may be found at http://www.transparency.org. 
  9introduce explicit deposit insurance (EI) during the period. The remaining thirty-eight 
countries (1605 observations) offer explicit insurance throughout the observation period. 
  For four different subsamples, Table II reports the mean leverage ratio, the 
standard deviation of returns on assets, and the mean insurance premium per dollar of 
deposits calculated from the three alternative models of deposit insurance summarized in 
Section I.  The first column reports values for observations recorded under an implicit 
insurance (II) regime.  These estimates pool observations from countries that never 
introduced explicit guarantees with pre-adoption observations for countries that 
introduced EI during our 1991-99 observation period. Column (2) pools all observations 
in years spent under an EI regime.  
  Standard t-tests indicate that the EI subsample is characterized by significantly 
higher leverage but significantly lower return volatility. Although mean IPP proves lower 
in the EI subsample, the differences in leverage and volatility broadly offset each other, 
so that the difference in premiums is not significant.  For each subsample, the mean 
values of leverage and return volatility vary only slightly across the three models.   
However, as one might expect, how forbearance is modeled does importantly affect the 
estimated value of deposit insurance guarantees. 
 Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002) argue that many of the countries that adopted 
deposit insurance in the 1990s lacked an appropriate institutional infrastructure and failed 
to compensate for imperfections in their contracting environments. For the subset of 
countries that introduced EI during the observation period, columns (3) and (4) in Table 
II compare results experienced under implicit and explicit regimes. The explicit-regime 
subsample shows significantly more leverage and insignificantly higher return volatility. 
  10However, fair deposit insurance premiums are significantly higher under the EI regimes 
than under the preceding implicit regimes.  For countries introducing EI during the 1990s, 
banks show an increase rather than a decrease in return volatility and a significantly and 
dramatically higher mean IPP.  This indicates that regulatory discipline did a poor job of 
replacing the depositor discipline that EI displaced. 
  Table III calculates the mean value of the fair deposit insurance premium for 
banks in each sample country under each of the models summarized in Section I. For 
each country, the value of government guarantees increases with the degree of 
forbearance assumed.  Values range from less than 0.001 percent for Australia, Austria, 
Germany, and Luxembourg using Merton’s minimal-forbearance model to a high of 
2.943 percent for Russia using RV’s maximal-forbearance formulation. Particularly large 
values are reported for countries known to have experienced a financial crisis during the 
observation period. 
III.  The Effects of Deposit Insurance on Risk-Shifting Behavior 
A.   Benchmark Runs 
  In this section, we examine the effectiveness of risk-shifting controls by 
expanding regressions (1) and (2) to combine bank-specific fixed effects with particular 
deposit-insurance design features. Likelihood-ratio and Hausman tests support the fixed-
effects specification over either a random-effects specification or a specification that 
dispenses with bank-specific effects. Because the Merton and Hovakimian-Kane models 
achieve much the same results, we report benchmark estimates for the Merton and Ronn-
Verma specifications only. 
  11  Tables IV and V let us compare results for four versions of regressions (1) and (2).  
In each table, results for the benchmark model are in the first column of Panel A and 
Panel B. The regressions explore two questions: 
1.   How strongly is bank leverage disciplined? 
2.  Do officials generate enough supervisory and regulatory pressure to offset the 
private discipline government guarantees displace? 
  The significantly negative estimates for α1 confirm that, on balance across the 
sample, regulatory capital requirements and private market pressure did generate risk-
restraining discipline. However, the significantly positive β1 value in the first column of 
Panel B tells a sadder story.  It implies that on average outside restraints on bank risk-
taking failed to neutralize risk-shifting incentives. 
  Column (2) estimates an expanded version of regressions (1) and (2). It interacts 
σV with a zero-one dummy variable for the presence of explicit insurance: the “EI 
Dummy.”  The significantly positive values found for this slope-shift parameter in the 
B/V regressions indicate that outside discipline declines when explicit deposit insurance 
lessens private policing activity. In the IPP regressions, the effect of explicit deposit 
insurance on risk shifting is insignificant both in Tables IV and V. However, in the 
minimal-forbearance Merton model (Table IV), the perverse coefficient on the EI dummy 
in the IPP regression is substantially smaller.  
  Columns (3) and (4) further expand the regressions to allow risk-mitigating 
features of deposit-insurance design also to shift the σV slope coefficient. The first 
experiment interacts a dummy variable that is set to one if deposit insurance premiums 
are risk-sensitive, and is zero otherwise. The regression experiments reported in column 
  12(4) look at two additional interactions. These experiments introduce dummy variables for 
the existence of coinsurance and limits on the size of insured balances.  The results show 
that the extent of subsidization depends critically on deposit insurance design. In both the 
leverage and the IPP regressions, coefficient estimates for explicit deposit insurance are 
significantly positive, but coefficient estimates for all three interacted risk-control 
features prove significantly negative.  This indicates that contractual controls designed to 
reduce bank risk-shifting incentives are at least partially successful. 
  The differences observed are economically significant.  For example, the results 
in column (4) of Table VI show that a percentage-point increase in asset volatility σV 
generates a 16 basis-point increase in IPP in countries without EI and a 26 basis-point 
increase in countries that adopt EI but refrain from introducing any risk-mitigating design 
features.  On average, increases in σV  have no effect on IPP when a country adopts all 
three risk-mitigating features.  
B.   How does risk-shifting change when a country adopts explicit insurance? 
  The insignificance of the interacted EI Dummy in column (2) of the IPP 
regressions in Tables IV and V may reflect differences in economic and political maturity 
between countries that adopted EI years ago and those that adopted it only recently. In 
this subsection, we focus on the subsample of 351 observations drawn from countries that 
installed explicit insurance during 1991-99. The analysis seeks to assess the quality of 
risk control in these countries in terms of the pattern of shifts in α1 and β1 observed in the 
post-adoption era. 
  The results, reported in Table VI, underscore the perverse effects on risk-shifting 
that introducing EI had in these countries. In both the B/V and the IPP regressions, 
  13significantly positive coefficients emerge for the interacted variable (EI Dummy × σV).  
This result confirms that regulators failed to compensate adequately for the private 
monitoring that EI displaced. The favorable effect of the Risk-Sensitive Premium 
Dummy in containing risk-shifting incentives loses significance in Table VI.  However, 
the slope-shift estimated for the Coverage Limits Dummy remains significantly negative 
in both the leverage and the IPP regressions.
7 
IV.  How risk-shifting is affected by specific country characteristics 
A. Differences in Risk-Shifting Across Environments 
In countries where political and economic freedoms are low and government 
corruption is high, households and firms should be reluctant to entrust their deposits to 
opaque banks.  In these circumstances, agents that become depositors are apt to insist on 
information flows and deterrent rights sufficient to police and price the risk exposure 
banks pass through to them. Kane (2000) argues that, in low freedom/high corruption 
countries, introducing explicit deposit insurance is apt to displace more private discipline 
than government regulators may reasonably be expected to generate in its stead. 
  Tables VII through IX test this hypothesis with data derived from the Merton 
model.
8  The tests investigate the extent to which coefficients of equations (1) and (2) 
differ across subsamples of countries whose institutional environments differ in specified 
ways.  In each table, observations have been ranked and grouped into subsamples 
according to the strength of a particular measure of the character of a country’s financial 
contracting environment.  Each experiment is limited to countries for which the particular 
                                                           
7 The Coinsurance Dummy could not be incorporated into these runs because no country in the recent-
adopter subsample requires coinsurance. 
  14measure is available.  In every panel, the σV coefficient benchmarks the risk-shifting 
opportunities that exist in the absence of explicit insurance, while the EI shift dummy 
estimates the adjustment in opportunities occurring in countries that have adopted EI. 
  Table VII investigates the effect of differences in political freedom using a three-
way partition developed by Freedom House.  Because this index is widely available, this 
experiment includes almost every observation studied in Tables IV and V.  In the 
leverage regressions, the coefficients show that, as freedom declines, private discipline 
tends to increase and so does the extent to which it is displaced by EI. The IPP 
regressions indicate that risk-shifting opportunities exist even without EI, except in the 
economies that show the least amount of political freedom.  Again, the effect of 
introducing EI grows as freedom declines.   
  Table VIII partitions the 1533 observations for which the Economic Freedom 
index exists. The “free” subsample includes all countries whose score on the index 
equaled or exceeded the median value of 2.3.  Results differ sharply between the two 
environments. In strong (i.e., “free”) contracting environments, explicit insurance 
strengthens rather than undermines private risk-shifting discipline.  However, and as we 
found in Table VII, in poor contracting environments, EI expands banks’ opportunities to 
shift risk. 
  Table IX examines the 1401 observations covered by the Corruption index.  Kane 
(2000) shows that in countries for which accounting standards have been indexed, the CP 
correlates strongly with the informativeness of accounting records.  CP may also 
correlate positively with a government’s capacity to collect taxes.  Countries are divided 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 The results (not reported) are qualitatively similar when the other two models are used. 
  15according to whether CP falls short of or exceeds 5, the midpoint of the index range.  In 
both regressions, benchmark discipline is greater in more-corrupt and less-transparent 
environments, and explicit insurance expands risk-shifting opportunities in high-
corruption environments.  In low-corruption countries, while EI exerts no significant 
effect on leverage discipline, its presence does serve to limit the size of the fair insurance 
premium.   
That explicit insurance arrangements control risk-shifting only in strong 
contracting environments accords with empirical evidence on how explicit insurance 
affects the probability of financial crisis as summarized in Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 
(2002).  Tables VII to IX support these authors’ contention that governments should 
repair weaknesses in their contracting environments before trying to establish an explicit 
deposit insurance system. The differences we observe continue to be economically 
significant.  For example, a percentage-point increase in asset volatility σV generates a 16 
basis-point increase in IPP in corrupt countries, but only a 10 basis-point increase in IPP 
in countries that are less corrupt. 
  As a robustness test, Table X investigates whether we can incorporate deposit-
insurance design features and potentially collinear country characteristics into summary 
regressions. In both the leverage and IPP equations, results confirm the patterns found for 
individual deposit-insurance features in Tables IV to VI.  However, the disruptions we 
observe in coefficient magnitudes from specification to specification support the 
hypothesis that unfavorable country characteristics adversely influence deposit-insurance 
design.  
  16Because the coverage of individual indices must overlap, the final catchall 
regressions must be run over a particularly small subsample.  The catchall IPP regression 
implies that when we control for levels of political repression, corruption, and restrictions 
on economic freedom at the same time, EI strongly expands risk-shifting and coinsurance 
and coverage limits significantly reduce it.  While economic freedom drops out of the 
catchall fair-premium regression, political repression promotes benchmark risk-shifting 
and integrity in government curtails it. 
B. Two-step regression model with self-selection 
It seems likely that the coefficient estimates found for deposit insurance design 
features in Tables IV and V are subject to sample-selection bias. Countries that adopt 
features to restrain risk-shifting behavior might have experienced less risk-shifting in any 
case, precisely because the overall contracting environment in these countries restrains 
risk shifting. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the coefficients for design features 
using Heckman’s (1976, 1978) two-step approach to control for self-selection. The 
endogenous variable in the first-stage Probit model is a dummy variable that indicates 
whether the design feature is selected or not. We investigate three features: risk-sensitive 
premiums, coinsurance, and coverage limits. The results of the second-stage model are 
presented in Table XI. Because Heckman’s method reduces the useable sample we also 
report OLS estimates for the original model using the parallel subsample.
9  The 
coefficient for Heckman’s lambda (also known as the inverse Mill’s ratio) measures the 
covariance of the error terms from the substantive regression and the selection equation. 
                                                           
9 The sample size is smaller because the first-stage Probit is estimated for observations with non-missing 
values of the indices of political freedom, economic freedom, and corruption. 
  17A significant coefficient on Heckman’s lambda indicates the presence of a sample-
selection bias.  
The results support the hypothesis of sample-selection bias, since the coefficient 
on Heckman's lambda is significant in all but one specification. However, taking account 
of selection affects only one policy implication: risk-sensitive premiums lose statistical 
significance in the IPP regression. However, the sample size in these runs is less than half 
of that employed in Table 4. Because this increases the standard error of each test, it 
makes it harder to reject the null. 
C. Switching Regression Model with Unknown Sample Separation  
This section uses a switching regression model with unknown sample separation 
(Maddala, 1983) to test the hypothesis that risk-shifting incentives vary with the strength 











2 2 ε σ α α + + = V V B , (13) 
  u Z I + = γ * . (14) 
  Equations (12) and (13) are risk-control equations that characterize the behavior 
of banks in the alternate regimes. Equation (14) is a sample-selection equation. It 
expresses a bank’s latent qualifications, I
*, to follow one or the other regime.  I
* is 
specified to be a function  of our three proxies for the quality of the institutional 
environment.  The sign of I* determines whether either B/V1 or B/V2 is observed: 
  B/Vit = B/V1it   iff  Iit
*  < 0  
                                                           
10 Three parallel equations are specified for the fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP. 
  18  B/Vit = B/V2it    iff  Iit
* ≥ 0. (15) 
This switching regression model offers three advantages. First, it estimates 
differences in risk-shifting behavior endogenously, without having to specify in advance 
either what regime applies to each bank or the value of the sample breakpoint.  Second, 
this model can investigate the individual and joint influence of several determinants of 
regime character.  Because environmental characteristics jointly govern sample selection, 
the model incorporates more information into the process of separating risk-control 
regimes.  Third, the model can assess the relative importance of our three proxies for 
institutional strength.   
  Table XII estimates the switching model for leverage control, while Table XIII 
reports parallel estimates for risk shifting.  Panel A reports the selection equations and 
Panels B and C present the alternate risk-control models. The coefficients reported in 
these tables are estimated by Maximum Likelihood. The likelihood function is as 
follows:
11 
  () ( ) [ ] ( ) it it it it Z Z L 2 1 1 ) ( ε φ γ ε φ γ − Φ − + − Φ = , (16) 
where φ(.) is the density function and Φ(.) is the cumulative of the normal distribution. 
  The selection equations model institutional strength more plausibly than the 
catchall leverage and premium regressions presented in Table X. Every country 
characteristic receives the same sign in both equations. Political repression and 
corruption each weaken the contracting environment. Although economic repression is 
                                                           
11 Shocks to leverage, B/V, and the shocks to the institutional environment are assumed to be uncorrelated. 
Attempts to estimate models that allow correlated errors in the risk-controls and the selection equations 
encountered convergence problems. 
  19found to strengthen controls on bank leverage, its effect on net risk shifting is only 
marginally significant. 
  The risk-control equations confirm our previous findings. In weak contracting 
environments, background controls are stronger, and introducing explicit insurance 
significantly undermines environmental controls. In strong environments, explicit 
insurance improves leverage control though, on balance, the extent of risk shifting does 
not change significantly. 
D. Regression Results by Geographic Region 
  As a final sensitivity test, we estimate the parsimonious risk-control equations 
featured in Tables XII and XIII for each of nine broad geographic regions. Of course, in 
any region where all member countries either do or do not offer explicit insurance, a 
slope-shift term for EI cannot be estimated.  Table XIV reports the results.  
Except between Eastern Europe and Latin America, leverage and risk-shifting 
coefficients vary significantly across all possible regional pairings.  Leverage and risk-
shifting control systems appear particularly strong in Australia (which has eschewed 
explicit insurance) and North America.  Although leverage discipline is exerted on 
balance in every region, risk-shifting opportunities vary substantially.  The coefficients 
for fair premiums are particularly high in Asia and Africa.  Countries that have adopted 
explicit insurance systems in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East appear 
to have managed to restrain risk-shifting incentives, but Western European countries with 
explicit insurance have intensified risk-shifting opportunities to some extent.  However, 
these results turn on some very small samples. For example, the subsample of Eastern 
European banks with no explicit deposit insurance consists of four observations derived 
  20from a single Russian bank. The subsample of Western European banks with no explicit 
deposit insurance consists of two observations of Greek banks and seven observations of 
Swedish banks. Therefore, the effect of explicit deposit insurance in Western Europe may 
be driven by relatively low risk-shifting in Sweden. 
In the fair premium regressions, the σv coefficient may be interpreted as a 
measure of the strength of implicit guarantees.  On this reading, expectations of depositor 
bailouts are extremely high in Eastern Europe and Latin America and moderately high in 
Asia and Africa. 
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
  Modern finance theory stresses that depositors and other creditors must mitigate 
incentives for opportunistic behavior by bank managers, owners, and borrowers.  To 
bond their willingness to behave nonopportunistically, banks must convey to depositors a 
degree of informational transparency and an appropriate set of deterrent rights.  Because 
individual efforts to monitor and police bank risk-taking exhibit wasteful overlaps, 
efficiency demands that depositor oversight be supplemented by some centralized 
program of monitoring and control.  This centralized program must be able to establish, 
enforce, and dynamically readjust protocols for verification, disclosure, truth-telling, 
promise-making, promise-keeping, and conciliation.   
In practice, risk-control protocols are imbedded in a financial safety net erected 
and managed by government officials. The ideal safety net is one that efficiently 
mitigates the particular monitoring and policing difficulties that present themselves in the 
contracting environment of a given country.  These difficulties are apt to vary with 
  21informational, ethical, legal, and economic subcultures that govern the design and 
enforcement of financial contracts. 
Public-choice theory recognizes that officials’ incentives differ in important ways 
from those of private creditors.  To persuade safety-net managers to make socially 
optimal choices, taxpayers must be able to observe and protect their stake in regulatory 
activities. 
  This paper investigates how well authorities in 56 different countries have 
restrained bank risk-shifting incentives in recent years.  Results show that the 
effectiveness of private and governmental controls on bank leverage and deposit-
insurance subsidies varies across contracting environments in predictable ways.   
In any country, explicit deposit insurance threatens to displace more private 
discipline than official oversight can generate.  In strong contracting environments, 
officials usually manage to avoid this result. Significant portions of the variation in the 
effectiveness of risk control are explained by differences in political climate, economic 
freedom, and government corruption.  Regressions incorporating these environmental 
factors are sensitive to model specification, but they indicate on balance that explicit 
deposit insurance expands risk-shifting opportunities in poor contracting environments. 
  Our data show that the displacement of private discipline is reduced in systems 
that impose appropriate combinations of loss-sharing rules, risk-sensitive premiums, and 
coverage limits.  Unfortunately, in poor contracting environments, explicit deposit 
insurance has an unhealthy appeal to policymakers.  Regression results confirm that 
recent adopters of explicit insurance have done a particularly poor job of replacing the 
depositor discipline that explicit insurance displaced.   
  22  Two important lessons follow.  First, weaknesses in risk control can generate 
large fiscal and social costs under an explicit insurance regime, a truth that most recent 
financial crises underscore. Because the effectiveness of risk control depends on deposit 
insurance design and country circumstances, in the long run adopting explicit insurance 
can easily do more harm than good. Countries with a poor contracting environment 
should upgrade this environment before adopting explicit deposit insurance. Second, 
even in a good contracting environment, the benefits of explicit deposit insurance depend 
critically on safety-net design.  Risk-mitigating features such as risk-based premiums, 
coinsurance and low coverage levels can curb bank risk-shifting. However, countries 
where government corruption is high and economic and political freedom is low find it 
difficult to adopt and enforce appropriate restraints. 
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  25Table I 
Panel A: Distribution of country-level variables 
 Mean  Median  Minimum Maximum  Obs. 
Explicit Insurance Dummy  0.78  1  0  1  2255 
Risk-Sensitive EI Dummy  0.21  0  0  1  1760 
Coinsurance  Dummy  0.15  0 0 1  1760 
Coverage Limits Dummy  0.72  1  0  1  1486 
Political Freedom Index  1.28  1  1  3  2192 
Economic Freedom Index  2.39  2.3  1.3  4  1533 
Corruption  Index  6.44 6.7  1  10 1401 
 
Panel B: Sample composition by country, year, and deposit insurance status 
 
Deposit 
insurance   Sample  years     
 
1 = Explicit 
0 = Implicit  Date enacted  From  To  # of banks  Obs. 
Argentina 1  1979  1993  1999  4  23 
Australia 0  n.a.  1992  1999  9  59 
Austria 1  1979  1993  1999  2  11 
Bangladesh 1 1984  1992  1999  6  39 
Brazil I  0  1995  1992  1994  6  7 
Brazil II  1  1995  1995  1999  6  24 
Canada 1  1967  1991  1999  9  57 
Chile 1  1986  1994  1999  1  6 
Colombia 1  1985  1992  1999  6  42 
Cyprus 0  2000  1993  1999  3  18 
Czech Republic  1  1994  1994  1999  4  22 
Denmark 1  1988  1992  1999  42  309 
Ecuador 0  1999  1994  1998  3  13 
Finland 1  1969  1992  1999  1  7 
France 1  1980  1991  1999  4  29 
Germany 1  1966  1992  1999  5  35 
Greece I  0  1993  1992  1992  2  2 
Greece II  1  1993  1993  1999  4  23 
Hong Kong  0  n.a.  1992  1999  10  59 
Hungary 1  1993  1995  1999  2  10 
India 1  1961  1992  1999  8  45 
Indonesia I  0  1998  1992  1997  8  42 
Indonesia II  1  1998  1999  1999  1  1 
Ireland 1  1989  1992  1999  3  24 
Israel 0  n.a.  1993  1999  3  18 
Italy 1  1987  1992  1999  21  146 
Japan 1  1971  1992  1999  16  126 
Kenya 1  1985  1992  1999  3  22 
Korea, Rep. of  I  0  1996  1992  1995  15  52 
  26Korea, Rep. of II  1  1996  1996  1999  16  47 
Luxembourg 1  1989  1992  1999  2  16 
Malaysia I  0  1998  1993  1997  9  36 
Malaysia II  1  1998  1998  1999  9  16 
Morocco I  0  1996  1993  1995  5  15 
Morocco II  1  1996  1996  1999  5  19 
Netherlands 1 1979  1992  1999  2  12 
Norway 1  1961  1992  1999  11  66 
Pakistan 0  n.a.  1992  1999  7  41 
Peru 1  1992  1993  1999  4  21 
Philippines 1 1963  1992  1999  10  64 
Poland 1  1995  1995  1999  6  26 
Portugal 1  1992  1992  1999  4  28 
Russia 0  n.a.  1995  1998  1  4 
Singapore 0  n.a.  1992  1999  6  45 
South Africa  0  n.a.  1992  1999  4  29 
Spain 1  1977  1992  1999  12  96 
Sri Lanka  1  1987  1992  1999  3  16 
Sweden I  0  1996  1992  1995  3  7 
Sweden II  1  1996  1996  1999  3  12 
Switzerland 1 1984  1992  1999  5  38 
Taiwan 1  1985  1992  1999  15  76 
Thailand I  0  1997  1991  1996  7  35 
Thailand II  1  1997  1997  1999  5  13 
United Kingdom  1  1982  1992  1999  8  60 
United States  1  1934  1992  1999  19  133 
Zimbabwe 0 n.a.  1993  1999  2  13 
Total         390  2255 
Notes: Countries that introduced deposit insurance during the sample period are reported twice – before 
and after the enactment of deposit insurance. n.a. indicates “not applicable”. In Cyprus, explicit deposit 
insurance was introduced in March 2000, after the sample period. Although Thailand and Malaysia do not 
have an explicit deposit insurance fund, their governments introduced blanket guarantees in 1997 and 1998, 
respectively. In effect, these guarantees imply explicit deposit insurance. 
  27Table II 
Mean Leverage, Volatility, and Fair Insurance Premiums Found in Different Subsamples 
The aggregate sample consists of 2,255 observations and covers risk-shifting behavior from 1991 to 1999.  
B is the face value of a bank’s debt, including deposits.  V is the market value of a bank’s assets. IPP is the 
banks’ fair deposit insurance premium. σV is the standard deviation of the banks' asset returns.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All 56 Countries  Countries with a change in deposit 
insurance status 
 Years  without 
Explicit Insurance




Years with Explicit 
Insurance 
Merton model with minimal forbearance     
B/V  0.879 0.891**  0.884 0.914** 
σV  0.049 0.039**  0.050 0.055 
IPP  (%)  0.180 0.127 0.211 0.617** 
Ronn and Verma (1986) with forbearance     
B/V  0.903 0.915**  0.909 0.939** 
σV  0.050 0.040**  0.052 0.056 
IPP  (%)  0.357 0.313 0.426 1.245** 
Hovakimian and Kane (2000) with forbearance     
B/V  0.879 0.891**  0.885 0.918** 
σV  0.050 0.040**  0.051 0.059 
IPP  (%)  0.264 0.211 0.325 1.029** 
Sample  Size  495 1760 196  155 
*,** Significantly different from the value in the “Years Without Explicit Insurance” column at 5 and 1 
percent, respectively. 
 
  28Table III 
Mean IPP Value for Each Sample Country 
(Expressed as a % of Deposits) 
Country 
Merton model with 
minimal forbearance 
Ronn and Verma (1986) 
with forbearance 
Hovakimian and Kane 
(2000) with forbearance
Argentina  0.361 0.579 0.379 
Australia  0.000 0.005 0.000 
Austria  0.000 0.374 0.001 
Bangladesh  0.067 0.769 0.165 
Brazil  0.923 1.701 1.333 
Canada  0.013 0.143 0.036 
Chile  0.003 0.018 0.003 
Colombia  0.039 0.107 0.056 
Cyprus  0.043 0.097 0.043 
Czech  Republic  0.057 0.323 0.116 
Denmark  0.091 0.178 0.097 
Ecuador  0.062 0.176 0.070 
Finland  0.010 0.109 0.015 
France  0.004 0.105 0.006 
Germany  0.000 0.152 0.000 
Greece  0.183 0.408 0.187 
Hong  Kong  0.441 0.614 0.461 
Hungary  0.078 0.422 0.099 
India  0.192 0.603 0.305 
Indonesia  0.466 0.798 0.600 
Ireland  0.002 0.018 0.002 
Israel  0.001 0.093 0.002 
Italy  0.016 0.135 0.033 
Japan  0.090 0.417 0.229 
Kenya  0.708 1.018 0.843 
Korea, Rep. of  0.280  0.853  0.526 
Luxembourg  0.000 0.066 0.000 
Malaysia  0.350 0.618 0.431 
Morocco  0.002 0.042 0.002 
Netherlands  0.003 0.030 0.003 
Norway  0.002 0.174 0.004 
Pakistan  0.078 0.403 0.172 
Peru  0.350 0.670 0.436 
Philippines  0.408 0.623 0.442 
Poland  0.155 0.276 0.163 
Portugal  0.005 0.058 0.006 
Russia  1.928 2.943 2.205 
Singapore  0.013 0.040 0.015 
South  Africa  0.054 0.211 0.059 
Spain  0.051 0.073 0.052 
Sri  Lanka  0.112 0.358 0.130 
Sweden  0.021 0.214 0.111 
Switzerland  0.002 0.006 0.002 
  29Taiwan  0.020 0.059 0.021 
Thailand  0.780 1.189 0.956 
United  Kingdom  0.011 0.092 0.012 
United  States  0.002 0.009 0.002 
Zimbabwe  0.536 1.157 0.803 
Unweighted Sample Mean  0.139  0.323  0.222 
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Evidence of Risk-Shifting Control, Using the Merton model with minimal forbearance 
Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank’s leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premium, IPP, to the volatility of its return on assets, σV, and particular 
deposit-insurance design features.  B is the face value of a bank’s debt, including deposits.  V is the market value of a bank’s assets. Regression input comes 
from the Merton single-period model of deposit with minimal forbearance. The sample consists of 2,255 observations covering risk-shifting behavior from 1991 
to 1999.  Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5%, and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively. 
Panel A. Leverage regressions. 
          (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
σV  -0.723** -25.9 -0.822** -16.5 -0.806** -16.3 -0.728** -15.8
EI Dummy ×σV                 
            
          
          
           
0.129* 2.4 0.177** 3.3 0.477** 7.7
Risk-Sensitive Premium Dummy ×σV  -0.478** -5.8 -0.597** -7.6
Coinsurance Dummy ×σV  -0.692** -5.7
Coverage Limits Dummy ×σV 
 
-0.303** -4.6
R-squared 0.774 0.775 0.779 0.792
Sample Size                 2255 2255 2255 1981
         
               
 
Panel B. Fair deposit insurance premium regressions. 
          (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
σV  14.086** 34.0 14.651** 19.8 14.908** 20.3 16.470** 23.7
EI Dummy ×σV                
            
          
          
          
-0.737 -0.9 0.036 0.0 7.086** 7.6
Risk-Sensitive Premium Dummy ×σV  -7.820** -6.4 -9.171** -7.8
Coinsurance Dummy ×σV  -9.940** -5.5
Coverage Limits Dummy ×σV  -9.515** -9.7
R-squared  0.530 0.531 0.541 0.611  
Sample Size                 2255 2255 2255 1981
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Evidence of Risk-Shifting Control, Using the Adapted Ronn and Verma model with substantial forbearance 
Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank’s leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the volatility of its return on assets, σV, and particular 
deposit-insurance design features.  B is the face value of a bank’s debt, including deposits.  V is the market value of a bank’s assets. Regression input comes 
from the adapted RV model of deposit insurance with forbearance.  The sample consists of 2,255 observations covering risk-shifting behavior from 1991 to 1999.  
Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively. 
Panel A. Leverage regressions. 
          (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff.  t-ratio
σV  -0.743** -25.8 -0.849** -16.5 -0.833** -16.3 -0.752** -15.8
EI Dummy ×σV                
             
           
           
           
0.138* 2.5 0.186** 3.3 0.492** 7.7
Risk-Sensitive Premium Dummy ×σV  -0.492** -5.8 -0.613** -7.6
Coinsurance Dummy ×σV  -0.705** -5.7
Coverage Limits Dummy ×σV  -0.310** -4.6
R-squared  0.774 0.775 0.779 0.791  
Sample Size  2255            2255 2255 1981  
             
               
 
Panel B. Fair deposit insurance premium regressions. 
          (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff.  t-ratio
σV  15.449** 30.3 14.360** 15.8 14.664** 16.2 16.408** 18.8
EI Dummy ×σV                
           
         
         
             
1.420 1.4 2.321* 2.4 10.085** 8.7
Risk-Sensitive Premium Dummy ×σV  -9.130** -6.1 -10.510**  -7.1
Coinsurance Dummy ×σV  -11.002**  -4.8
Coverage Limits Dummy ×σV  -10.469**  -8.5
R-squared  0.530 0.530 0.539 0.596
Sample Size  2255              2255 2255 1981
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Evidence of Risk-Shifting Control, generated from the minimal-forbearance Merton model  
for countries changing deposit insurance status during 1991-99 
Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank’s leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the 
volatility of its return on assets, σV, and specified deposit-insurance design features: B is the face value of a 
bank’s debt, including deposits.  V is the market value of a bank’s assets. Regression input comes from 
Merton’s single-period model of deposit insurance with minimal forbearance. The sample consists of 351 
observations in countries that installed explicit insurance between 1991 and 1999.  Estimates that differ 
significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively. 
Panel A. Leverage regressions. 
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
σV  -0.776** -7.5 -0.712** -7.6 
EI Dummy ×σV  0.452** 4.6 0.798** 8.0 
Risk-Sensitive Premium Dummy ×σV     -0.547  -0.6 
Coverage Limits Dummy ×σV     -0.964**  -7.9 
R-squared  0.624  0.692  
Sample Size  351  351  
 
Panel B. Fair deposit insurance premium regressions. 
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
σV  21.961** 11.7 23.309** 13.9 
 EI Dummy ×σV  1.341 0.7  8.264**  4.6 
Risk-Sensitive Premium Dummy ×σV     -2.143  0.1 
Coverage Limits Dummy ×σV     -19.605**  -9.0 
R-squared  0.643  0.722  
Sample Size  351  351  
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Differences in Risk-Shifting Control Across Environments Marked by Differences in  
Political Freedom, using Merton Model with Minimal Forbearance 
Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank’s leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premium, IPP, to the 
volatility of return on assets, σV.  B is the face value of a bank’s debt, including deposits.  V is the market 
value of a bank’s assets. Regression input come from Merton’s single-period model of deposit insurance 
with minimal forbearance.  The sample consists of 2,192 observations covering risk-shifting behavior from 
1991 to 1999.  Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, 
respectively.  In each panel, the last row reports the p-value of the F-test that the coefficients in the 
subsample regressions are the same. 
Panel A. Leverage regressions. 
  Free  Partly Free  Not Free 
  Coeff.  t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
σV  -1.258**  -13.9 -1.317** -12.1 -1.847**  -4.7 
EI Dummy ×σV  0.417**  4.5 0.640** 5.9 1.650** 3.8 
R-squared  0.850   0.759  0.677  
Sample Size  1639   502   51   
F-test (p-value)  0.00       
 
 
Panel B. Fair deposit insurance premium regressions. 
  Free  Partly Free  Not Free 
  Coeff.  t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
σV  2.355* 2.0 6.104** 4.6  -1.806 -0.2 
EI Dummy ×σV  7.992**  6.5 8.690** 6.6 25.710* 2.3 
R-squared  0.717   0.681  0.458  
Sample Size  1639   502   51   
F-test (p-value)  0.00       
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Evidence of Risk-Shifting Control Across Environments Marked by Differences in 
Economic Freedom, using Merton’s Minimal-Forbearance Model 
Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank’s leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premium, IPP, to the 
volatility of its return on assets, σV.  B is the face value of a bank’s debt, including deposits.  V is the 
market value of a bank’s assets. Regression input comes from Merton’s single-period model of deposit 
insurance with minimal forbearance.  The sample consists of 1,533 observations covering risk-shifting 
behavior from 1995 to 1999.  Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked 
*, and **, respectively. In each panel, the last row reports the p-value of the F-test that the coefficients in 
the subsample regressions are the same. 
Panel A. Leverage regressions. 
 Free  Not  Free 
 Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio 
σV  -0.229** -3.6  -1.354** -12.0 
EI Dummy ×σV  -0.838** -9.8  0.760**  6.8 
R-squared  0.899   0.783   
Sample Size  820   713   
F-test (p-value)  0.00      
 
 
Panel B. Fair deposit insurance premium regressions. 
 Free  Not  Free 
 Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio 
σV  19.451** 23.7  2.151  1.3 
EI Dummy ×σV  -11.646** -10.6  11.869**  7.2 
R-squared  0.675   0.589   
Sample Size  820   713   
F-test (p-value)  0.00      
 
  36Table IX 
Evidence of Risk-Shifting Control Across Environments that Differ in Corruption 
Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank’s leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premium, IPP, to the 
volatility of its return on assets, σV.  B is the face value of a bank’s debt, including deposits.  V is the 
market value of a bank’s assets. Regression input comes from Merton’s single-period model of deposit 
insurance with minimal forbearance.  The sample consists of 1,401 observations covering risk-shifting 
behavior from 1995 to 1999.  Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked 
*, and **, respectively. In each panel, the last row reports the p-value of the F-test of the hypothesis that 
the coefficients are the same across each pair of subsamples. 
Panel A. Leverage regressions. 
  Less Corrupt  More Corrupt 
 Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio 
σV  -0.479** -7.3  -2.138**  -9.9 
EI Dummy ×σV  0.061 0.8 1.468** 7.0 
R-squared  0.870   0.788   
Sample Size  915   486   
F-test (p-value)  0.00      
 
 
Panel B. Fair deposit insurance premium regressions. 
  Less Corrupt  More Corrupt 
 Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio 
σV  16.656** 24.7  -5.906*  -1.7 
EI Dummy ×σV  -6.517** -8.1  22.319**  6.6 
R-squared  0.682   0.630   
Sample Size  915    486   
F-test (p-value)  0.00       
 
  
  37Table X 
Evidence of Risk-Shifting Control Incorporating Deposit-Insurance Design Features and Country 
Characteristics 
Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank’s leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the 
volatility of its return on assets, σV, and specified deposit-insurance design features: B is the face value of  
the market value of a bank’s assets. Regression input comes from Merton’s single-period model of deposit 
insurance with minimal forbearance. Higher values of political freedom index correspond to less freedom. 
Higher values of economic freedom index correspond to less freedom. Higher values of corruption index 
correspond to less corruption. The sample consists of observations in countries for which the included 
country indices exist.  Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and 
**, respectively. 
Panel A. Leverage regressions. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Coeff.  t-ratio Coeff.  t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff.  t-ratio
σV -1.056** -12.6 -0.229  -1.8 -0.852** -6.9  -1.464** -3.5
EI ×σV  0.646** 10.2 0.624** 9.0 0.606** 7.6 1.175** 12.3
Risk-Sensitive Premium 
Dummy ×σV -0.564** -7.4 -0.507** -5.6 -0.524** -4.9  -0.417** -4.1
Coinsurance Dummy ×σV  -0.650** -5.5 -0.556** -4.7 -0.544** -4.4 -0.521** -4.4
Coverage Limits Dummy ×σV -0.252** -3.9 -0.444** -6.2 -0.657** -8.4  -0.263* -2.5
Political Freedom Index ×σV 0.064 1.4         0.164  1.8
Economic Freedom Index × σV     -0.218** -4.0    -0.059  -0.6
Corruption Index × σV         0.039*  2.4  -0.030  -1.2
R-squared  0.800   0.857  0.847  0.866  
Sample  Size  1918   1332  1193  1092  
Panel B. Fair deposit insurance premium regressions. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
σV 9.913** 7.6 14.963** 8.8 24.141** 16.6  1.084  0.2
EI ×σV  8.525** 8.7 10.860** 11.5 6.582** 7.0  16.712** 16.6
Risk-Sensitive Premium 
Dummy ×σV -8.565** -7.3 -6.620** -5.4 -4.093** -3.3  -1.512  -1.4
Coinsurance Dummy ×σV  -8.706** -4.8 -6.198** -3.9 -4.380** -3.0 -3.182** -2.6
Coverage Limits Dummy ×σV -8.604** -8.7 -13.544** -14.0 -15.759** -17.2 -8.228** -7.4
Political Freedom Index ×σV 2.948** 4.2         7.140**  7.6
Economic Freedom Index × σV    -0.680  -0.9    -0.001  0.0
Corruption Index × σV         -1.180** -6.2  -1.735** -6.6
R-squared  0.592  0.702  0.770  0.808  
Sample  Size  1918  1332  1193  1092  
 
  38Table XI 
Evidence of Risk-Shifting Control, generated from the minimal-forbearance Merton model allowing for self-selection 
Fixed-effects regressions using Heckman’s (1976, 1978) two-step method relating a bank’s leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the 
volatility of its return on assets, σV, and particular deposit-insurance design features.  B is the face value of a bank’s debt, including deposits.  V is the market 
value of a bank’s assets. The dependent variable of the first-stage Probit model is a dummy variable that indicates whether the design feature is selected or not. 
As design features we consider risk-sensitive premiums (column 1), coinsurance (column 2), and coverage limits (column 3). Regression input for the second-
stage regression comes from the minimal-forbearance Merton model of deposit insurance. For comparison purposes, we also report the OLS estimates of the 
original regression equation (panels B and D). Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively. 
Panel A. Leverage regressions 












  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
σV  -0.708** -18.5 -0.710** -18.4 -0.652** -16.9 -0.670** -17.4 -0.255** -3.7 -0.245** -3.6
Risk-Sensitive Premium Dummy ×σV  -0.192  -1.3 -0.205  -1.5          
           
        
          
                  
Coinsurance Dummy ×σV  -0.426** -3.9  -0.421** -3.9
Coverage Limits Dummy ×σV  -0.506** -5.8  -0.539**
 
-6.2
Lambda  -0.012** -4.9 -0.007** -3.4 0.539*  -2.4
R-squared  0.295 0.300 0.267
Sample Size  928                  928 975 975 541 541
       
   
   
Panel B. Fair deposit insurance premium regressions 












  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
σV  12.645** 20.6 12.633** 20.5 13.455** 21.8 13.175** 21.5 25.736** 23.8 25.818** 23.9
Risk-Sensitive Premium Dummy ×σV  -2.074  -0.8 -5.144* -2.4         
           
       
        
              
Coinsurance Dummy ×σV  -6.656** -3.8  -6.581** -3.8
Coverage Limits Dummy ×σV    -18.495**
 
-13.3 -18.767**









R-squared  0.316 0.327 0.533
Sample Size  928                  928 975 975 541 541
       
   
   
 
  39Table XII 
Switching Regression Model of Leverage Control with Sample Selection Based on Country Characteristics 
 
Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank’s leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the volatility of its return on assets, σV, and specified 
deposit-insurance design features: B is the face value of  the market value of a bank’s assets. Regression input comes from Merton’s single-period model of 
deposit insurance with minimal forbearance. The sample consists of observations in countries for which the included country indices exist.  Estimates that differ 
significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Weak institutional environment selection equation. 
 (1)        (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
Intercept 4.126** 7.0 -1.671** -8.7 -1.077** -4.0 1.300** 7.7
Political freedom Index  0.695**  4.3  1.088**  7.3         
Economic freedom Index 
 
-1.176**  -7.5      0.329**  3.1     
Corruption Index    -9.5          
              
-0.365** -0.241** -9.5
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280
       
                 
 
Panel B. Risk-shifting when the institutional environment is weak. 
    (1) (2)      (3) (4)
Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
σV -1.746** -14.0 -1.674** -12.7 -1.722** -13.2 -1.747** -13.6
EI×σV                 
              
1.234** 10.6 1.272** 10.2 1.325** 10.7 1.291** 10.7
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280
       
                 
 
Panel C. Risk-shifting when the institutional environment is strong. 
    (1) (2)      (3) (4)
Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
σV -1.451** -14.8 -1.418** -11.2 -1.463** -19.4 -1.440** -18.6
EI×σV                 
              
-0.282** -2.9 -0.334** -2.6 -0.300** -3.9 -0.317** -4.1
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280
       
                 
 
  40Table XIII 
Switching Regression Model of Fair Deposit Insurance Premiums with Sample Selection Based on Country Characteristics 
 
Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank’s leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the volatility of its return on assets, σV, and specified 
deposit-insurance design features: B is the face value of  the market value of a bank’s assets. Regression input comes from Merton’s single-period model of 
deposit insurance with minimal forbearance. The sample consists of observations in countries for which the included country indices exist.  Estimates that differ 
significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Weak institutional environment selection equation 
 (1)        (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
Intercept 1.418** 3.5 -1.657** -16.0 -2.371** -13.4 1.680** 15.8
Political  freedom Index             
            
              
  0.594**  6.8 1.202** 15.4
Economic freedom Index 
 
-0.247*  -2.2      0.922**  12.5     
Corruption Index -0.281**  -10.6 -0.299** -17.4
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280
       
                 
 
Panel B: Risk-shifting when the institutional environment is weak 
    (1) (2)      (3) (4)
Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
σV -0.673 -0.7 -0.655 -0.6 -0.655 -0.6 -0.676 -0.7
EI×σV                 
              
10.322** 11.0 10.324** 10.9 10.320** 10.9 10.320** 11.0
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280
       
                 
 
Panel C: Risk-shifting when the institutional environment is strong 
    (1) (2)      (3) (4)
Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
σV 0.056* 2.1 0.049 1.6 0.050 1.9 0.053* 2.1
EI×σV                
              
0.032 1.2 0.041 1.3 0.040 1.5 0.034 1.4
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280
       
                 
  41Table XIV 
Evidence of Risk-Shifting Control Across Regions 
Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank’s leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the volatility of its return on assets, σV, and specified deposit-insurance 
design features: B is the face value of  the market value of a bank’s assets. Regression input comes from Merton’s single-period model of deposit insurance with minimal 
forbearance. Higher values of political freedom index correspond to less freedom. Higher values of economic freedom index correspond to less freedom. Higher values of 
corruption index correspond to less corruption. The sample consists of observations in countries for which the included country indices exist. Estimates that differ significantly 
from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Leverage regressions. 
  Western Europe  Eastern Europe  North America Latin America Middle East  Africa  South Asia  East Asia  Australia 
Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
σV    -1.045**  -10.7  -0.418  -1.2  -2.069** -24.9 -0.481** -3.7 -0.704* -2.1 -0.676* -2.2 -0.854** -6.3 -0.843** -9.9 -3.190** -10.2
EI ×σV  0.231*                       
                          
2.3 -0.780* -2.1 -0.533** -3.3 -1.533** -5.9 0.512 1.5 0.551 6.0
R-squared 0.859 0.843 0.955 0.759 0.886 0.699 0.856 0.666 0.803
Sample Size  939                             62 190 177 52 64 100 612 59
   
 
Panel B. Fair deposit insurance premium regressions. 
  Western Europe  Eastern Europe  North America Latin America Middle East  Africa  South Asia  East Asia  Australia 
    Coeff. t-ratio      Coeff.  t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
σV      3.724**  3.0  21.794**  13.1  0.281* 2.2 29.449** 15.2 0.515** 9.1 9.876 1.3 10.723** 10.4 13.617** 11.4 0.006* 2.1
EI ×σV  4.864**  3.8  -17.078**  -9.6         
                           
  -23.455** -9.6 -0.303** -6.7 13.505  1.5 9.176** 7.1
R-squared 0.558 0.928 0.302 0.733 0.716 0.450 0.630 0.639 0.256
Sample Size  939                               62 190 177 52 64 100 612 59
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